Policymakers seeking to structure smoothly-managed pension systems for their aging workforces are beginning to acknowledge the key importance of pension plan administrative expenses. Such expenses, if not well-understood, run the risk of eroding pension accumulations for retirement. Thus imagine Pension Plan A deducts one percent of participant assets in investment management fees, while Pension Plan B deducts two percent of assets, annually over a 40-year horizon. Though this annual differential might seem small, it adds up: the participant in Plan A will have 27% more in assets by retirement age, as compared to his otherwise identical counterpart in Plan B (Bateman et al., 2001) . Consequently, what might appear to be small differences in pension management fees can result in substantial differences in eventual retirement benefits.
In this paper, we use new information on Australian pension plan structures and costs obtained in collaboration with the Australian Superannuation authorities.
1 A unique aspect of this dataset is that it contains excellent information on a diverse set of pension institutional forms. In Australia, unlike in other countries, there is much variety in pension industrial structure. For instance, some plans are 'closed' or limited to employees of a firm sponsoring the plan; other pensions are open to all workers in an industry; and still others are retail plans, open to the general public ('public offer' funds). Hence the analysis can explore how administrative expenses vary along three key dimensions: pension plan size (assets and participants), plan type (defined benefit or defined contribution), and sponsor type -that is, whether the plan has a single employer sponsor, an industry structure, or is offered in the retail market. Further, the analysis explores the links between administrative expenses and a range of operational features, relating to collection of contributions, transfers between plans, account management, asset management, payment of benefits, and reporting and disclosure.
The results reveal important differences in pension plan expenses resulting from plan design and size. Hence it appears that some types of market organization are more cost-effective than others, in terms of converting retirement saving into retirement assets. In view of the trend toward funded pension accounts, this analysis has important implications for international pension design policy.
Methodology
Previous research examining pension administrative expenses has focused on money management, record-keeping, and other charges associated with collecting the contributions, managing the plans, and paying benefits. 2 These studies have arrived at several conclusions regarding pension plans operating in the United States:
• In the US, annual defined contribution (DC) per member expenses are between $US 50-300 per year, with the lower costs applying to large plans; defined benefit (DB) expenses range from $US 70-600 ($ 1999). Expenses as a fraction of plan assets average 0.3-0.7 percent of assets for defined benefit plans, and 0.2-0.8 percent for defined contribution plans.
• Large plans are more costly than smaller ones, and defined benefit plans are more expensive to manage than defined contribution plans.
• Scale economies are particularly important with regard to asset management.
• Wide differences in retirement system administrative expenses are detected across plans, with much of the variability attributable to pension plan size, pension plan structure, and plan management practices.
• In a competitive environment, plans that outsource money management do not pay expenses that differ materially from those who manage their investments in-house.
Whether these findings also apply to pension plans operating in other countries is not yet known, though there is reason to expect some cross-country differences. One reason is that countries differ with regard to the way their pension systems are organized. For example, the US for the most part uses a single-employer approach, where each employer sponsors its own pension offerings. In other countries, pension managers can operate on more of a retail basis, competing for business across employers who sponsor plans, or in some cases competing for individual members. In Australia, for instance, a variety of structures are offered -single employer, multi-employer and retail. Governance structures also differ internationally: in some cases employees tend to be represented on pension boards, while in others, professional managers control most decisions. Additionally, countries differ with regard to the environment in which pension systems operate, with some following a "prudent man" investment rule and others having to live within portfolio limits on plan investment allocations.
We use a cost function approach to ask how pension expenses in the Australian context behave. The methodology draws on prior analysis of US data by Mitchell and Andrews (1981) ,
and . We hypothesize that scale economies will be evident in the Australian case, inasmuch as production inputs tend to be lumpy investments such as computers, payroll systems, money management systems, and accounting systems. Hence as the pension system expands, plan costs could rise less than proportionately as the plan takes advantage of these scale economies. If the evidence confirms that there are substantial cost savings from larger pension plans, this would imply that merging and coalescing groups of participants and plan assets into larger pools could save participants and plan sponsors money. And conversely, breaking up large pension pools might make retirement systems less cost-effective, rather than more so.
In the US context, researchers report that pension costs do rise with plan size, as measured by assets and participants, but that this effect is less than one-for-one. Thus in an analysis of private multi-employer defined benefit plans, incrementing the number of plan participants by one percent (holding benefits payable constant) increased pension administrative costs by 0.8%, or less than proportionally (Mitchell and Andrews, 1981 ; a similar result was obtained for public sector defined benefit pensions, see . Scale economies have also been reported with regard to pension plan assets: that is, holding constant the number of plan participants, boosting the plan's assets by one percent (holding participants constant) increased costs by only 0.27% in the private sector and 0.49% in the public sector.
These findings thus confirm substantial economies of scale in US defined benefit pension plans, but little is known about the cost consequences of other types of plans, and plans in other parts of the world.
In the present research, we test for scale economies in the Australian context with information on almost 2,000 defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans reporting data for the financial year 1998-99. These are evaluated with a multiproduct cost function of the following form:
where C i represents the actual administrative costs of a retirement system i, Y is a vector of system outputs, W is a vector of input prices faced by each system, α α α α is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and ε i is the error term.
the value of assets held by the system (ASSETS i ), and the number of participants (PART i ).
Expenditures for investment management are expected to rise with assets, but if scale economies exist, a plan with more assets will incur lower administrative expenses per dollar invested.
Similarly, expenditures would be expected to rise with participants, but if economies of scale exist, growth in the number of participants would generate less than a proportionate increase in administrative expenses.
In the estimation context, the empirical equation relating expenses and size becomes (after taking natural logs):
Where C i is the actual administrative expenditure of the pension plan, ln(PART i ) and ln(ASSETS i ) refers to the (natural log of ) participants and plan assets, X refers to other factors to be described below.
5 Specifically we ask whether α 1 and α 2 are less than 1, which if so would indicate evidence of scale economies. These are the hypotheses tested in the empirical analysis, below.
Expense and Plan Design Data
Australia has a national mandatory pension law requiring employers to offer retirement saving plans under a scheme known as the Superannuation Guarantee (SG). This program was launched in 1992, and it supplemented a system of occupational retirement saving plans that had previously covered around 30% of private sector and 65% of public sector workers. Under the this system, all employers are required to contribute 9% of payroll on behalf of their employees to a private funded pension plan. As a general rule, each employer acts as a plan sponsor selecting the pension plan's structure; in addition the sponsor selects plan features including asset management, structure, governance rules and other plan design (Bateman et al, 2001 ).
Employers may elect to run the plan in-house, may participate in a industry-wide plan, or may allow workers to participate in a plan offered at the retail level. All superannuation plans are supervised by, and must provide annual returns to, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, APRA, indicating aspects of plan structure and performance.
For the present research, we have access to the 1998-99 annual returns of all Australian superannuation plans containing data on plan characteristics as well as on plan administrative expenses. 6 These reports furthermore indicate plan type, asset size and membership, and numerous other operational features. For the present analysis we concentrate on a sample of 1,920 superannuation plans with at least 10 members and at least $A1 million in assets; this group accounts for 80% of all superannuation assets and plan members.
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The particular value of this dataset is its inclusion of a wide range of plan types, plan structures, and plan sponsor formats. For the present purposes, we group explanatory variables of most interest into the following categories:
• Plan scale: measured by assets and membership; • Plan type: specified as defined benefit or defined contribution;
• Sponsor type: identified as having an employer sponsor (or sponsors) or being offered in the retail market. Employer sponsors may be single employers in the private or public sectors, or multi-employer sponsors from an industry. 8 Retail plans are 'open' (to the general public -that is, a 'public offer' fund) while most employer-sponsored plans are 'closed' (limited to a single employee group); and • Operational features: which includes a range of variables relating to collection of contributions (proportion of member contributions, inward transfers as a proportion of assets), account management (internally or externally managed), asset management (proportion of assets externally managed, whether members can choose portfolios), payment of benefits (benefits as a proportion of assets, outward transfers as a proportion of assets), and reporting and disclosure (external review, or not).
Just over half of the plans (57%) are of the defined contribution variety, with the remainder being defined benefit. This is not surprising since the Superannuation Guarantee regulation somewhat favors defined contribution plans. 9 In the single-employer private market (corporate funds), the split is around half, whereas defined contribution plans predominate in the multi-employer market (industry funds) and in the retail sector. It is also interesting to note that almost one-third of the public sector plans in Australia are of the defined contribution type, 10 a pattern that diverges markedly from the US public pension arena where the defined benefit model continues to dominate (Mitchell and Hustead, 2000) . (See Appendix).
In terms of the structure of plans in Australia, some plans permit access to the general public ("open" or "public offer" plans) while others are "closed", or limited to a set of related employers or a single industry. As a result, single employer (corporate plans), multi-employer (industry plans), and public sector plans are primarily closed plans, while retail plans are, by definition, open. In total, 83% of plans are closed while 17% are open (that is, marketed to the general public). It might be thought that public offer plans would be more expensive to manage in view of their need to advertise and compete in the marketplace, as compared to closed plans not subject to the market test. In fact, most public offer funds are offered in the retail market. On the other hand, the fact that public offer funds (and by implication, retail plans) face competitive 9 Hybrid plans here are included in the defined benefit plan classification. 10 This results partly from the fact that the Superannuation Guarantee explicitly applied to public sector workers previously uncovered by pension systems. In addition, growing awareness of large liabilities under unfunded pressure on fees and service might render them less expensive in practice. Which effect is stronger is an empirical question.
Descriptive statistics on reported administrative expenses per member appear in Table 1 and Figure 1 . 11 The mean pension expense reported is about $A 560 per member per year, or about $US 320; 12 this figure is in the mid-range of the comparable US data for defined benefit plan expenses ($US 70-600). The mean also conceals substantial cross-sectional variance, as revealed by the very long right tail in Figure 1 .
[ Table 1 and Figure 1 here]
Defined benefit plans report expenses one-third higher (35%) than the sample mean, while defined contribution plans are 25% less expensive. To put it differently, reported defined benefit plan participant costs are 85% higher than those reported by defined contribution plans.
This substantial difference is partly attributable to the fact that defined benefit plans require more actuarial and funding analysis, and they are more likely to pay lifelong annuity benefits instead of lump sum payments, as compared to defined contribution plans. Retail plans appear to have somewhat lower reported expense levels than do employer-sponsored plans, though the standard deviations imply wide confidence bounds around the means. The simple tabulation may be misleading, however, since retail funds are relatively immature in Australia, having smaller asset pools as compared to long-standing employer-sponsored plans (with the exception of those with multi-employer sponsors). Below we investigate whether retail plans have higher expenses as a proportion of assets, other things equal.
defined benefit plans has prompted public sector employers to close them down over time, replacing them with defined contribution plans. 11 Administrative expenses are defined as 'all expenses of an administrative and investment management nature'. 12 We assume an exchange rate of $A1 = $US.60, and all data are in 1999 nominal terms.
There are some striking differences within the employer-sponsor category. For instance, multi-employer plans report annual per-member expenses much smaller than those for other plans -one-quarter the size, with a much lower overall variance. Whether this is a robust finding is not known, but it may indicate that multi-employer plans perform fewer services than do other plans, or alternatively they may under report their expenses. It is worth noting that Australian multi-employer plans were specifically set up in the mid-to late 1980s to provide low-cost access to retirement saving to workers not previously covered by occupational pension arrangements. In the US, however, relative plan expense comparisons go the other directionthat is, multi-employer plans tend to report higher expenses than do single employer pensions.
This may be because the multis tend to have more complete expense information reported to them than do single employer plans, inasmuch as single employer plans could handle expenses for payroll and other related benefits internally rather than computing and charging all relevant expenses to the pension plan. By contrast, participating multi-employer groups may seek to offload costs to the plan rather than covering them internally. This expense differential in the US does not work in the same direction in Australia.
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Administrative expenses expressed as a fraction of assets are also given in Table 1 . The mean reported expense ratio is 1.08 percent of assets, or 108 basis points (bp). This is much higher than in the US, where plan expenses as a fraction of assets lie between 0.2-0.9 percent of assets. There is substantial variation in the Australian marketplace, graphically depicted in Figure   2 . Though most plans charge less than 1% of assets (100 bp) per year, some do charge up to 400 bp, a rate that can have a potent effect on retirement accumulations. A further look at Table 1 indicates that the low-cost providers (in terms of plan-related costs) tend to be the employer- 13 It is also possible that single-employer plans underreport expenses in Australia for the same reason, in which case reported expenses may be too low relative to the full economic cost of providing the plan. sponsored funds (mainly corporate and public sector funds), whereas the retail plans are the most expensive to manage. This may be related to the size of assets under management, since many single employer (corporate) and public sector plans are older and have accumulated substantial assets for mainly middle to high-income earners. The exceptions here are the multi-employer plans that cater mainly to unionized workers. The higher expenses for retail plans may be due to the fact that these plans are required to market themselves; they do not have a captive membership as do closed plans, they generally provide more choice over investment strategies (including investment managers), they offer insurance options and other services such as financial planning, and they often use agents (and therefore would be paying commissions). By plan type, defined contribution plans expend more of assets in fees and expenses, whereas defined benefit plans appear less costly in terms of asset fees.
[ Figure 2 here]
Multivariate Model Results
A multivariate regression framework helps refine our understanding of the empirical links between administrative expenses, plan size and type, sponsor type, and operational features.
In Table 2 we explore the relationship between pension administrative expenses (in natural logs) and plan size, measured along two dimensions, assets and number of plan participants (again measured in natural logs). We also control on pension plan type (expressed as a 0/1 qualitative variable with DC being the reference category), sponsor type (employer-sponsor is the reference group) and a range of operational variables. The operational variables include collection of contributions (member contributions as a proportion of total contributions, inward transfers as a proportion of assets), account management (internal account management is the reference group), asset management (fraction of assets managed externally), benefit payments (benefits paid as a proportion of assets, outward transfers as a proportion of assets), and reporting and disclosure (no external review is the reference group).
[ Table 2 here]
The cost model implies that having more assets and participants will add to pension plan administrative expenses, but at a less than one-for-one rate if scale economies exist. That is, coefficients on these two variables are expected to be positive but less than one if the hypothesis is supported. Table 2 Results for other explanatory variables are also interesting. First, defined benefit plans are detected to have one-third higher reported expenses than defined contribution pensions (see Model 1). Retail plans are found to have 70% higher expenses than plans with employer sponsors (either single or multi). 14 Among the operational variables, there is a positive and significant relationship between expenses and benefit payments as well as outward transfers, and a negative relationship between member contributions and inward transfers. It is worth noting that outsourcing of account or asset management does not raise expenses over in-house management, nor does offering member choice.
We extend Model 1 by interacting all variables with DB plan type dummies (Model 2) and 'retail' sponsor type dummies (Model 3). Most important, the findings for scale economies are similar. Most interactions in both of these models are statistically insignificant, though an Ftest rejects the hypotheses that the entire vector of interactions is equal to zero (for both models).
Among the interactions, it appears that allowing member contributions raises costs for defined benefit plans, but this greatly lowers costs for retail plans. In retail plans, it is far less costly to manage benefit payments, and expenses rise less with participants than for employer sponsored plans. But expenses rise with assets faster in the retail than the employer sponsored plans.
Further those retail plans allowing member investment choice are 80% more costly than those that do not.
A summary of estimated effects of plan characteristics on expenses is provided in Table   3 . Here we report predicted administrative expenses per member and as a percent of assets, holding constant other variables. Three scenarios are indicated, for typical small, median, and large plans. Among small plans, the employer-sponsored defined contribution model appears to be the least-cost design with absolute dollar levels at $A 307 per annum, while the retail plan design is the highest-cost with an annual charge of $A 620. Turning to asset-based fees, the same relative rankings apply: the employer-sponsored defined contribution model is least costly to operate, with a small plan spending about 77 basis points in expenses (or 0.77% of assets), while the employer-sponsored defined benefit model costs 107 basis points and the retail plan costs 155 basis points. The range is smaller and plan costs more similar across type as the plans 14 The impact of alternative employer sponsors was tested, but after controlling for plan size and type, there was no statistically significant difference in administrative expenses between single-employer, public sector, or multi grow larger. Large retail plans can expect annual administrative expenses of $A 193 per member, or 48 basis points, compared with expenses of $A 95 per member (24 basis points) for employersponsored defined contribution plans or $A 134 per member (33 basis points) for employersponsored defined benefit plans.
[ Table 3 here]
When these predicted administrative expenses are fully translated into fees and charges, they reduce pension accumulations at retirement. Table 4 reports how the estimated pension administrative expenses would erode pension accumulations at retirement. For instance, in small plans, the impact is substantial: predicted administrative expenses would cut retirement accumulation by 28% for retail plans, compared with 21% for employer-sponsored defined benefit plans, and 15% for employer-sponsored defined contribution plans. The impact falls considerably with plan size. For large plans, the retirement asset would be 10% lower for retail plans, 7% for employer-sponsored defined benefit plans, and 5% for employer-sponsored defined contribution plans. For the median Australian plan, expenses would be predicted to cut retirement accumulations by 22% for retail plans, 16% for employer-sponsored defined benefit plans, and 12% for employer sponsored defined contribution plans.
[ Table 4 here]
Discussion
Debate about plan design and pension administrative costs are of keen interest to those seeking to shape the global trend towards privately managed funded pensions. This analysis of the Australian market is of general interest because of the wide range of plan design models that have developed in the context of that country's mandatory employer-sponsored retirement saving system. We summarize our findings as follows:
employer funds.
• Mean pension expenses in the Australian system average about $US 320 per member per year or 1.08 percent of assets. This dollar figure is not far from the US range, but the expense ratio is much higher.
• As in the US, larger plans in Australia are more costly to manage than smaller ones, but expenses rise less than proportionately. Confirming scale economies, we find that a onepercentage point increase in assets raises costs by about half a percentage point (holding participants constant), and a one-percentage point increase in participants (holding assets constant) raises costs by around 0.4 percent. The asset effect is similar to that measured in the US public sector pensions plans, but larger than in US private sector pension plans. The participant effect is only half that found for US private sector plans, suggesting substantial economies of scale in the Australian context.
• Using data on a wide array of pension plan structures, we conclude that the least costly Australian plan design is the employer-sponsored plan, both single-employer and multiemployer pensions. Retail plans available to the general public are about 70% more expensive than employer-sponsored plans.
• Defined benefit plans are around 30% more expensive to manage than defined contribution plans.
• After controlling for assets, participants, and plan type, there is no statistically significant difference in the expenses of single-employer, multi-employer, or public sector plans, although higher expenses are indicated for retail plans.
• Providing member investment choice in retail plans is 80% more expensive than nonprovision. Few of the other operational variables have a significant impact. For instance, in Australia as in the US, using external asset management does not have a statistically significant impact on plan expenses. This may point to the competitive nature of both financial marketplaces.
• Measured administrative expenses could erode the retirement assets in small retail plans by 28%, by 21% in small employer-sponsored defined benefit plans, and by 15% in employer-sponsored defined contribution plans. This effect is smaller in larger plans.
Our findings may be compared to other studies investigating charges levied on customers of other financial products. US retail mutual fund expenses are examined by James, Smalhout and Vittas (1999) , while Whitehouse (2000) and Bateman et al. (2001) survey administrative charges in other pension systems. The key difference between the present study and others is that previous research focused only on charges levied on fund customers, rather on expenses reported by pension plan managers. There appears to be a considerable distinction between pension plan charges to customers and total plan expenses (Bateman et al., 2001 ). In the medium to long run, of course, expenses charged to plan managers will eventually translate into customer charges, but perhaps not in a transparent way.
The implications of our findings for pension plan design are substantive, since they point to important scale economies in terms of both plan assets and participants. This raises the question of whether some plans are simply too small and/or too inefficient to be compatible with investor prudence, in the Australian environment as well as internationally. Specifically, our results indicate that employer-sponsored defined contribution plans are least costly.
Nevertheless, in Australia as well as elsewhere, there has been a move to provide pension participants with access to retail plans marked individually. This usually goes along with choice over investment strategy. Our results suggest that, after controlling for plan size and type, retail plans open to the general public are considerably more expensive than are employer-sponsored plans, and that member investment choice adds considerably to costs. In future work we will extend our analysis to an investigation of pension plan performance as well as governance. Table 1 and Appendix for variable means. **Coefficient significant at the 5% level. 
